Abstract. In sectors with high competition for talent, equity-based compensation is a crucial feature of the compensation contract, because it appears to be associated with higher pay. Using a detailed survey of law school graduates, we explore why firms use equity-based compensation. We find that individuals who hold jobs that make them more visible and that allow them to shift effort from tasks that are valueenhancing for the employer to tasks that are self-enhancing are more likely to receive equity-based compensation in markets with high competition for talent. While individuals with higher abilities receive higher pay, they are not more likely to be awarded more equity-based compensation. These findings indicate that equity-based compensation arises in an optimal contract, because competition for talent creates retention problems and accentuates agency problems in the allocation of effort.
Introduction
Compensation for talent has increased dramatically in many professions (Acemoglu, 2011) . Pay has surged not only for US CEOs, but also for top finance industry employees and for corporate lawyers (Kaplan and Rauh, 2009; Philippon and Reshef, 2012) . Most research efforts have focused on the level of US top executive compensation. However, an equally striking fact is that a large fraction of the compensation of the highest paid executives is equity-based (Murphy, 1999; Frydman and Saks, 2010) . In fact, in his handbook chapter, Murphy (2012) points out that explaining differences in the level of executive compensation requires explaining why some executives receive more equity-based compensation than others. This paper explores pay practices in the financial and especially the legal sector and shows that the positive correlation between the level of pay and the proportion of equity compensation is a much broader phenomenon and not restricted to the executives of large listed companies. Furthermore, it appears that equity compensation is used to a larger extent in labor markets in which there is more competition for talent, because there are more potential employers and job vacancies.
In these labor markets, individuals may be able to find more jobs that are good matches for their skills and talents and, having more bargaining power toward their employers, they may be able to appropriate a larger part of the surplus they generate.
Individuals' career concerns can also be stronger in labor markets with more competition for talent, as individuals' efforts to improve their credentials to obtain better jobs are more likely to be rewarded with outside offers.
Using an underexploited survey of US law school graduates that provides unique information on compensation contracts, tasks, and individual characteristics, we are able to investigate the drivers of the differences in pay practices we observe.
The high correlation between equity-based compensation and the level of pay can be explained by two sets of theories. Most theories of the market for talent build on the seminal work of Rosen (1981) . Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) , Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Terviö (2008) highlight that the level and the differences in executive pay are consistent with a competitive equilibrium of a market in which heterogeneous firms and individuals match. In a labor market with more competition for talent, there are presumably more firms that represent a good match for an individual's skills.
Thus, in equilibrium, individuals' productivity and consequently pay are higher. To the extent that employees' effort is more productive when individuals are better matched to jobs, not only the level of pay but also the proportion of equity-based compensation may be optimally higher (Edmans, Gabaix and Landier, 2009; Baranchuk, MacDonald and Yang, 2011) .
Others have noted that competition for talent may affect compensation contracts also because it affects the incentives of talented employees, due to their ability to switch to potentially better jobs (Oyer, 2004; Rajgopal, Shevlin, Zamora, 2006) . These models highlight the inefficiencies that emerge when employees' actions are driven by career concerns and the option to move to better jobs (Goldman and Slezak, 2003; Acharya, Pagano and Volpin, 2012) . In this context, a high fraction of equitybased compensation emerges as an optimal contract to reestablish employees' incentives to take a longer view on their tenure at the current employer (Holmström, and Ricart-i-Costa 1986; Narayanan, 1985 and 1996; Giannetti, 2011; Ellingsen and Kristiansen, 2012) and is desirable especially if individuals' performance is highly visible or if individuals are difficult to monitor and can reallocate effort between tasks that either create value for the firm or improve their own future job opportunities.
We test whether the compensation contract is a reflection of the fact that in labor markets with high competition for talent, individuals are better matched to jobs and paid the value of their productivity or if instead equity is used for employee retention and to mitigate agency problems. Using a granular survey of law school graduates, we can scrutinize the determinants of the proportion of equity compensation and focus on which tasks and skills are more likely to be remunerated with equity compensation in labor markets with high competition for talent. We show that the proportion of equity compensation is larger for individuals that perform tasks that make them more visible and that are employed in labor markets with more potential employers or more demand for their skills. Similarly, individuals who can easily reallocate efforts between tasks are more likely to receive equity compensation in labor markets with high competition for talent. We find that, although individuals with more ability and skills receive higher pay, there is no evidence that they are more likely to be remunerated with equity in labor markets with more competition for talent. Thus, our findings indicate that competition for talent affects workers' incentives and leads to more equity-based compensation and higher pay.
Existing research documenting a positive correlation between the level of pay and the proportion of equity-based compensation has mostly focused on the US executive labor markets (see Murphy, 1999; Bebchuck and Grinstein, 2005) . In a recent paper, Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos and Murphy (2013) show that also outside the US the level of executive pay is positively associated with the proportion of equity-based compensation and that international differences in executive pay are determined by the fact that equity compensation is lower outside the US. Not only we show that this relation holds outside the executive labor market, but we are also able to investigate the mechanisms that lead to more equity-based compensation.
Existing literature has produced mixed evidence on whether the market for talent, managerial incentives, or corporate governance better explain the cross-sectional differences and time-series variation in the level and the structure of compensation.
There is some evidence that CEOs' talents and skills are related to their compensation (see, for instance, Fee and Hadlock, 2003; Custodio, Ferreira and Matos, 2013) , but it has proved far more difficult to test how changes in the competition for talent affect incentives. There are also no horse races attempting to test whether equity-based compensation emerges to attract the most talented individuals or to solve incentive problems that arise on the job and to retain individuals in labor markets with high competition for talent.
The main reason for the lack of empirical tests of this strand of the theoretical research on executive pay is that we lack information on executives' tasks and time allocation on the job. A notable exception is Bandiera, Guiso, Prat and Sadun (2012) who, using the calendar of 119 Italian CEOs, provide evidence that time allocation is subject to agency problems and that CEOs of poorly governed firms spend more time with outsiders, presumably increasing the chances of being offered a better job in the future.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider how tasks and compensation are associated and to show empirically that equity-based compensation arises in the attempt to solve agency problems in the allocation of time, especially for employees in labor markets with high competition for talent and who are assigned tasks that make them more visible to potential employers or who can discretionally allocate more time to these tasks.
Theoretical Framework
Our objective is to test the relative importance of two alternative, but not mutually exclusive, sets of theories implying that competition for talent leads to more equitybased compensation and consequently higher pay.
The first stream of theories builds on the seminal work of Rosen (1981) and highlights that the level and the differences in executive pay are consistent with a competitive equilibrium of a market in which heterogeneous firms and individuals match (Gabaix and Landier, 2008; Terviö, 2008 ). An implication of these theories is that more competition for talent, that is, a labor market with a greater number, and presumably variety, of employers and vacancies, allows a more efficient assignment of individuals with different skills to jobs. Higher pay would simply reflect the higher productivity of talent resulting from more efficient job assignments, especially if better (second-best) job opportunities increase individuals' outside options.
More efficient job assignment may also result in higher pay-performance sensitivity and therefore a higher proportion of equity-based compensation if the effort of talented individuals becomes more productive (Baranchuk, MacDonald and Yang, 2011) . These theories, however, have no particular prediction on the horizon of pay and higher pay-performance sensitivity may well rely on a bonus, not necessarily on equity-based compensation, which implies participation in long-term profits.
Other theories show that competition for talent may accentuate agency problems in the allocation of time (Goldman and Slezak, 2003; Acharya, Pagano and Volpin, 2012) . In particular, individuals may devote their efforts to tasks that are selfenhancing because they enhance their visibility and the marketability of their skills at other firms, thus increasing the probability of obtaining outside offers, even if devoting more effort to other tasks would be value-enhancing from the point of view of the employer (Giannetti, 2011) . These conflicts of interest become more severe if there is high demand for an individual's talents and for individuals who are hard to monitor because they have high discretion in designing their jobs, they have to come up with creative ideas, and have the ability to act independently and make decisions. This is also the case for individuals that get good networking opportunities from their jobs and are, as a result, more visible to potential employers.
In these theories, mitigating agency problems in the allocation of effort and inducing employees to have a longer horizon at the current job implies that individuals have to receive a large enough share of future profits. Thus, compensation must depend on long-term performance and, in this respect, be equity-based (Holmström, and Ricart-i-Costa 1986; Narayanan, 1985 and 1996; Giannetti, 2011; Ellingsen and Kristiansen, 2012) . Similar effects cannot be achieved with a bonus, which represents a reward for short-term performance. Since theories imply that the crucial difference between bonuses and equity based compensation is whether they make compensation sensitive only to short-term performance or also to long-term performance, hereafter, we will use interchangeably the terms long-term compensation and equity-based pay.
Data and Empirical Proxies
Our analysis relies on two main data sources: Capital IQ People Intelligence for the Financial Sector and the second wave of the survey "After the JD", sponsored by the American Bar Foundation for the legal sector. We describe the data sources and the main empirical proxies below. 
Financial Sector

Legal Sector
As primary source of information for the legal sector, we use the survey "After the JD", carried out by the American Bar Foundation, in order to gather detailed data about the careers and experiences of a national cross-section of law graduates. The survey aims to offer a nationally representative picture of lawyers' careers trajectories, by following the careers of new lawyers over the first 10 years after law school graduation. The second (and, for our purposes, more detailed) wave of the survey, conducted during 2007, explores the career outcomes of a cohort of about 3,700 lawyers in the US. We only keep individuals who practice law and work in a full-time position. We also disregard lawyers who are solo-practitioners or work in firms with less than 5 employees. We further require information on pay and the state the lawyer is working in. This procedure leads to a final sample of 1,854 observations. However, in some tests, we rely on fewer observations due to missing controls.
The survey is particularly well suited to investigate the relevance of the mechanisms suggested by different compensation theories for several reasons. First, it provides information on the level and the structure of compensation of law school graduates. Second, the survey provides a host of details on the talents and skills of the respondents and the characteristics of the jobs they hold, such as the discretion that an individual has in designing her own work and the opportunities for networking. In addition, the survey provides information on how individuals actually allocate their time across different tasks, the number of hours worked, a proxy for effort, and measures of individual output, such as the number of new clients brought to the firm, the revenues generated, and the number of billable hours. Finally, the survey provides information on the state in which an individual is currently employed.
We can thus explore how the structure of pay in the legal sector varies depending on competition for talent in the state. We expect competition for talent in the state to matter if labor markets for law school graduates are segmented. We can plausibly assume that most job opportunities of law school graduates are within the state of current employment not only because of moving costs, but also because there exist idiosyncrasies in state laws that segment markets. Furthermore, the costs for a firm of identifying a promising job candidate are related to the distance of that candidate.
Oyer and Schaefer (2010) provide evidence fully consistent with the segmentation of labor markets in the legal sector by showing that law firms tend to hire lawyers who attended nearby law schools.
Importantly, US states differ dramatically in the demand for lawyers. Many more law firms have offices in New York, Washington DC or Chicago than in the Plains or the Rocky Mountains. This implies that there are significantly different levels of competition for talent that we can exploit to explore the effects of competition for talent on the compensation contract.
To obtain proxies for the competition for talent, we match "After the JD" with data from Economic Modeling Specialists Intl., a consulting company that focuses on employment data and economic analysis, from which we obtain the number of annual job openings for lawyers in US states. We account for differences in the size of the labor market by dividing the number of job openings for lawyers in a state by the number of lawyers in that state, which we obtain from the Occupational Employment
Statistics of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We measure job openings and number of lawyers in 2007, the year of the survey, but results are very similar to the ones we present hereafter if we use a different year. Results are also unchanged if, instead of the number of lawyers, we standardize by the number of employees of the legal sectors, which we also obtain from the Occupational Employment Statistics.
Below we discuss more in detail the different measures of compensation, job characteristics, talent, and contractual outcomes used in the empirical analysis.
Compensation Measures
The survey provides information on the following compensation items: salary, bonus, profit sharing, stock options and any other employment compensation. For each of these items, individuals are asked to report how much compensation they received from their primary employer during the calendar year.
On average, law school graduates have a total pay of slightly over 130,000 USD, but there is large variation with pay ranging from 80,000 USD in the 25% percentile to about 167,000 USD in the 75% percentile. As we did for the financial sector, we define two alternative proxies for equity-based compensation. First, similarly to existing literature (e.g., Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos and Murphy, 2013), we use the proportion of equity-based compensation. About 16% of the lawyers receive any type of incentive pay; conditional on receiving any equity pay, the fraction of incentive pay is 13% with a standard deviation of 21%.
Moreover, the survey provides information on whether an individual is a partner and, therefore, participates in the firm's profits, and a self-assessment of the probability of becoming a partner in the current company. Slightly less than 10% of the individuals in the sample are already partners. About 93% of the lawyers who are not already partner report a non-zero self-assessed likelihood of becoming either equity or non-equity partner in future. 4 The corresponding likelihoods for equity partners and non-equity partners are 89% and 77%, respectively.
Since we are mostly interested in the association between level of pay and equitybased compensation, we are concerned that, when we use the proportion of equitybased compensation, this may arise mechanically from the fact that, when the value of equity (as well as other forms of equity-based compensation) is high, due to positive shocks to firm performance, compensation is mechanically higher. For this reason, to focus on the structure of the contract, in most of the analysis, we rely on a dummy that takes a value equal to 1 if an individual is awarded any equity-based compensation and a value equal to zero otherwise.
This proxy has other two additional features that make it particularly appropriate in our context. First, it does not force us to sum and treat as homogeneous different forms of equity-based compensation, such as stocks and options that have potentially very different distributions and vesting periods.
Second, as noted before, in the legal sector, individuals expect to share profits because they are partners or they expect to be promoted to partners. Also firms vary widely in the proportion of lawyers that are partners (Oyer and Schaefer, 2010),
suggesting that being promoted to partner is a feature of the labor contract that may respond to market conditions. Being a partner or the promise to become a partner in the future are alike to equity-based compensation, because an individual is awarded or expects to be awarded a share of future profits. While we are unable to quantify it as a proportion of current pay, we can easily take this feature of the contract into account when we explore whether an individual is awarded any form of equity-based compensation, using a dummy variable.
Thus, most of our analysis relies on a dummy variable, Any long-term incentive pay or partner, that takes a value of 1 if an individual receives any amount of equitybased compensation or other long-term incentive plans, or if the individual is a partner. According to this definition, in our sample, about 18% of the lawyers receive any form of equity compensation with a standard deviation of 38%.
Job characteristics
Our data allow us to test to what extent the characteristics of a job, and, in particular, an individual's ability to shift effort between tasks, are related to compensation.
To capture the cross-sectional implications of the theories, we define the following proxies. Our first proxy captures that creative tasks, which involve coming up with new ideas, are harder to monitor. Survey respondents can choose five options from 1 (Never) to 5 (Very frequently) to the question whether they are required to design important aspects of their work and to put their ideas into practice. We define a dummy, Design your own work, which takes value equal to 1 if an individual is asked very frequently to design her own work and to implement her ideas, and equal to zero otherwise. This dummy takes a value equal to 1 for 55% of the respondents.
The second proxy captures to what extent a job provides networking opportunities through training programs, mentorships, and colleagues at other firms. We surmise that individuals with these job characteristics have higher visibility to the external labor market. This may exacerbate the retention problems highlighted by theoretical models in a way that the optimal contract entails more equity-based compensation. Our data provide a wealth of demographic information about the individual, such as gender, age, ethnicity, tenure, graduation year, and family background such as whether the mother or the father was a lawyer. We use this information to construct control variables at the level of the employee or organization. We measure the age (and age squared) as the age of the employee at the date of the survey. We control for the ethnicity by having a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one if the employee is white. We include dummies for the gender and marital status of the employee. We also control for the year when the college and law degrees were obtained. Last, we add two dummies that are equal to 1 if the mother (father) of an individual is a lawyer as well.
In terms of the current job, we measure tenure (and tenure squared) as the number of years an individual has been working for the current organization. We proxy for the size of an organization by counting the number of lawyers working there.
Contractual Outcomes
Importantly, we are able to explore the effects of equity-based compensation in markets with different competition for talent. We are able to measure overall effort using the number of hours worked during the last week as well as the way in which an individual allocates effort between between different tasks. In particular, we explore to what extent competition for talent creates an agency problem in the allocation of effort using the number of hours dedicated to outside activities, defined as the fraction of hours dedicated to these activities during the last week.
We are also able to directly evaluate the effects of the contract on the ability to retain an individual at the current firm, because individuals are asked what their horizon at the current job is. In particular, respondent can choose among the following alternatives: whether they are already looking for a new job; whether they plan to remain with the current employer at most one year; one or two years; 3 to 5 years, or more than 5 years. We define an individual to have a Short horizon at the current employer, if she is already looking for a new job or has a horizon of at most two years. We also explore the effect of equity based compensation on the responses using an ordered probit model.
Finally, we also evaluate the effects of the contract structure on the individual's output using billable hours, the number of new clients an individual has brought in, and the revenues generated by these new clients. Table 2 shows that the level of pay in the financial sector is positively associated with the fraction of total long-term incentive pay. This result does not depend on different practices across countries or time trends, because we control for these factors throughout the analysis by including country and year fixed effects. This correlation is also economically meaningful as increasing the fraction of total long-term incentive pay by one standard deviation corresponds to a 74% increase in total pay.
The correlation between the fraction of total long-term incentive pay and level of pay is even stronger in the financial centers, whether we consider the whole sample or restrict the analysis to the US. For instance, increasing the fraction of long-term incentive pay by one standard deviation is associated with an increase of 98% of total pay in a financial center but only with an increase of 54% in the rest of the world.
Presumably, in financial centers there are more potential employers and competition for talent is fiercer.
As noted before, a positive relation between the level of pay and the fraction of equity-based compensation may depend on the fact that both, the value of equity and the value of the payout associated with equity-based compensation, increase when firms experience positive shocks to their performance. To avoid concerns that the correlations we highlight depend mechanically on firm performance, we use as alternative and main measure of equity-based compensation a dummy that takes a value equal to 1 if an individual is awarded any form of equity based compensation, and takes value equal to zero otherwise. Results in columns 4 to 6 are invariant.
Finally, in column 7, we add a dummy that takes a value equal to 1 if the individual has any bonus pay. Also individuals who receive bonuses have higher pay;
however, especially in financial centers, where competition for talent is presumably stronger, long-term incentive pay is associated with higher total pay. Receiving any long-term incentive pay is associated with an increase of 209% of total pay in a financial center; the effect of bonus pay on the level of pay in a financial center is only half.
The Legal Sector
In Table 3 , we present the same set of exercises as in Table 2 using our survey of law school graduates, which allows for deeper scrutiny. Also in the legal sector, the level of pay appears to be higher for individuals that receive equity-based compensation. Furthermore, the correlation is stronger in states in which competition for talent is fiercer.
Talented individuals who attended top-tier law schools or colleges also receive higher pay. We then start to test which theories explain better our findings. Theories However, controlling for these individual characteristics leaves the correlation between the level of pay and the presence of equity-based compensation unchanged providing preliminary empirical evidence that equity-based compensation is unlikely to be a tool to compensate the most talented employees. However, there is evidence that having attended a top-tier law school is associated with higher compensation, especially in labor markets with high competition for talent.
Finally, in column 9, we explore whether equity-based compensation is special or a bonus has similar effects on the level of pay. While individuals who receive bonuses have higher pay, the effect of receiving a bonus on pay does not depend on the proxy for competition for talent as for equity-based compensation.
The Determinants of Equity-Based Compensation
The evidence in Table 3 suggests that differences in talent are unlikely to explain the difference in compensation structure that is associated with higher pay. Here we start testing more directly the determinants of equity-based compensation. To test theories that posit that competition for talent may have perverse effects on incentives, we explore whether equity-based compensation is more likely to be associated with certain tasks and whether it is more so for individuals employed in labor markets with higher competition for talent. Similarly, we test whether individuals with higher ability and skills receive more equity-based pay and whether this depends on competition for talent. This translates in a 67% higher likelihood.
Most importantly, we find that all individuals with jobs that provide more visibility and in which there may be more severe moral hazard problems in the allocation of time and effort become more likely to be awarded equity-based compensation as competition for talent increases. This indicates that theories relying on both the nature of the tasks and competition for talent, are relevant in explaining contract structure.
Importantly, none of these results may depend on the geography of the labor market and the fact that jobs involving some tasks are more likely to be concentrated in some states, because the results are invariant when we include state fixed effects.
To evaluate the relevance of different theories, it is, however, important to test whether the tasks matter per se or because individuals with higher ability are more likely to be assigned jobs that involve more responsibility and visibility.
Furthermore, our results are invariant, if we control for the ranking of the college or the law school attended by the individual and if we allow the effect of the latter to depend on the extent of competition for talent in the state. This indicates that our estimates are unlikely to be driven by the fact that individuals with more talents and abilities are assigned challenging tasks and that this is particularly the case in labor markets with more competition for talent.
If anything, more talented individuals are less likely to receive equity-based compensation. Oyer and Schaefer (2010) report that over 80% of top law school graduates work in the most prestigious law firms. Since retention problems are likely to be less severe at these firms, theories based on retention motives imply that individuals employed by these firms should receive less equity-based compensation.
This consideration allows us to perform an additional test. The retention problems highlighted by the theories are expected to be more severe at small firms not only because these are less prestigious than big law firms, but also because small firms face higher turnover costs (see Kuhnen and Oyer (2012) for a similar argument).
5
Therefore, if our interpretation of the determinants of pay structure is correct, we expect the correlation we have highlighted so far to be stronger at small firms. In Table 5 , we repeat part of the tests in Table 4 distinguishing between small and large firms. The results fully support our conjecture. An individual working in a job which requires her spending time outside the office in a state with average competition has a 41% percentage point higher likelihood of receiving long-term incentive pay if she 5 Local labor markets may also be less relevant for prestigious firms because individuals are more inclined to move for prestigious jobs. Also this argument would imply that our results should be stronger for small firms.
works in a small organization compared to an otherwise similar person and job in a large organization.
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For further robustness, in column 3 of Table 5 , we consider separately the fraction of long-term incentive pay. To take into account that for some individuals this fraction is equal to zero, we use a Tobit regression model. Also when we use this different metric, we continue to find that individuals who are more subject to agency problems in the allocation of effort, because they are able to spend time outside the office as part of their job, receive a larger proportion of equity-based compensation, especially in markets with high competition for talent.
We then consider that a less restrictive interpretation of the theory would imply that similar mechanisms should increase not only the probability of having long-term incentive pay, but also the expectations of being awarded any as part of the labor contract. Companies could do so by committing to promote their associates to partners, under certain conditions. Theories that stress retention problems imply that the promotion should be more likely for individuals who are able to misallocate effort to self-enhancing tasks in markets with high competition for talent.
Since individuals provide a self-assessed probability of being promoted to partners, to avoid biases, we define a variable that takes value equal to 1 if the respondent deems the probability to be strictly positive, and equal to zero otherwise. Observations are set to missing for individuals that are already partners. Consistently with our previous findings, the estimates in specification 4 show that individuals who would be able to misallocate effort to self-enhancing tasks in markets with high competition for talent are more likely to be promoted to partners.
Last, we run a falsification test using Any bonus pay as a dependent variable. The retention problem cannot be solved with a bonus, which represents a reward for shortterm performance. Hence, we would not expect to see that individuals with more outside visibility are more likely to receive a bonus in markets with high competition for talent. The estimates in column 5 is consistent with this conjecture.
Contractual Outcomes
If our interpretation of the results so far is valid, we would expect that equity-based compensation reduces misallocation of effort and lengthen individuals' horizons on their current jobs. Using the survey, we are able to test these predictions. Throughout this part of the analysis, we control for the level of pay and the individual's ability
proxied by the quality of the law school she attended.
We indeed find that individuals who receive equity-based compensation are less likely to expect to quit their current job within two years. Interestingly, and consistently with the theory, equity-based compensation appears less effective in achieving this goals in labor markets with high competition for talent, which is where it is presumably more profitable for individuals to search for better employers.
Unsurprisingly, also higher pay lengthens an individual's horizon at the current job.
Results are similar if we estimate an ordered probit model and exploit the different horizon ranges an individual provides.
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While higher pay is associated with more hours worked, equity-based compensation does not seem to increase total effort; instead, consistent with theories based on retention motives, equity based-compensation appears to reduce misallocation of effort. In particular, individuals with equity-based compensation spend less time on outside tasks, which we proxy using the fraction of hours spent outside the office. Importantly, in markets with high competition for talent where agency problems in the allocation of effort are expected to be more severe, as theories would imply, equity-based compensation is less successful in achieving its goal.
Finally, it appears that individuals with equity-based compensation are more productive in terms of generating new business. They are more likely to bring in new clients and, conditional on bringing in new clients, these are more valuable. However, this result is not robust when we explore how the effect differs depending on competition for talent.
Conclusions
Equity-based pay has been suggested to play a crucial role to understand why executive pay has increased so much in the last decades (Murphy, 2012; Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos and Murphy, 2013) . We show that equity-based compensation is positively associated with the level of pay also in other professions, characterized by labor markets with high competition for talent.
This relation would be consistent both with models that stress employees' innate abilities and the quality of the match to jobs and with models that suggest that competition for talent affects career concerns and employees' ex post incentives to allocate effort to self-enhancing tasks increasing the probability of future, more prestigious, job offers. We show, however, that equity-based compensation is associated with the nature of the tasks an individual performs and to the extent of competition for talent in the local labor market, but not to proxies of individuals' innate abilities. Thus, it appears that equity-based compensation, and the increase in the' level of pay that this brings about, are predominantly due to the fact that Desired stay with the current firm. Respondent can choose among the following alternatives: (value equal to 1) whether they are already looking for a new job; (value equal to 2) whether they plan to remain with the current employer at most one year; (value equal to 3) one or two years; (value equal to 4) 3 to 5 years, or (value equal to 5) more than 5 years. 3.76 1.46 3.00 4.00 5.00 1401
Probability partner Dummy variable that is equal to one if the self-assessed probability partner of becoming partner (equity or non-equity) is non-zero 0.93 0.26 1.00 1.00 1.00 950 Probability equity partner Dummy variable that is equal to one if the self-assessed probability partner of becoming an equity partner is non-zero 0.89 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 940 Probability non-equity partner Dummy variable that is equal to one if the self-assessed probability partner of becoming a non-equity partner is nonzero 0.77 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 777
Design your own work Dummy variable which takes value equal to 1 if an individual is asked very frequently to design her own work and to implement her ideas, and equal to zero otherwise. 
Table 2 Level of Pay in the Financial Sector
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total pay. Fraction of total long-term incentive pay is the fraction of restricted stocks plus stock grants plus options plus LTIPs over total pay. Any long-term incentive pay is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one if compensation contains any longterm incentive pay. Any bonus pay is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one if the employee received a bonus in a given year. Financial center (worldwide) is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one if the country hosts a financial center worldwide from Global Financial Centers Index by the Z/Yen Group. Financial center (USA) is a dummy variable that takes a value equal to one if a state in the US hosts a financial center as in Christofferson and Sarkissian (2000) . Regressions are estimated using OLS and include year fixed effects as well as country fixed effects (state fixed effects in the USA sample). Errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) 
Table 3 Level of Pay in the Legal Sector
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total pay. Fraction of total long-term incentive pay is the fraction of restricted stocks plus stock grants plus options plus LTIPs over total pay. Any long-term incentive pay or partner is a dummy variable equal to one if a lawyer receives any equity or option pay or if she is already a partner. Any bonus pay is a dummy equal to one if the employee received a bonus in a given year. Vacancies per lawyer is the number of job openings for lawyers in a state standardized by the number of lawyers in that state. Top tier law school (college) is a dummy variable equal to one if the lawyer graduated from a top tier law school (college). All remaining variables are defined in Table 1 . Regressions are estimated using OLS and include different set of fixed effects as denoted at the bottom of the table. Errors are clustered at the state level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 4 Structure of Pay in the Legal Sector
The dependent variable is Any long-term incentive pay or partner, which is a dummy variable equal to one if a lawyer receives any equity or option pay or if she is already a partner. Vacancies per lawyer is the number of job openings for lawyers in a state standardized by the number of lawyers in that state. Top tier law school (college) is a dummy equal to one if the lawyer graduated from a top tier law school (college). Any time outside office is a dummy variable equal to one if the lawyer spends any time attending networking functions or recreational networks that involve socializing with peers at other firms. Job provides good network opportunities is a dummy equal to one if the job allows for networking opportunities. Design your own work is a dummy variable equal to one if an individual is asked very frequently to design her own work and to implement her ideas. Primarily responsible for clients is a dummy variable equal to one if the lawyer is responsible for her clients. The set of demographic controls are defined in table 1 and consists of Age, Age squared, Tenure, Tenure squared, Female, White, Married, Mother is a lawyer, Father is a lawyer, and Number of lawyers in organization. Regressions are estimated using OLS and include different set of fixed effects as denoted at the bottom of the table. Errors are clustered at the state level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Table 5 Heterogeneous Effects and Robustness
The dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is Any long-term incentive pay or partner which is a dummy variable equal to one if a lawyer receives any equity or option pay or if she is already a partner. The dependent variable in specification (3) is the fraction of long-term incentive pay defined as the fraction of equity plus option pay over total pay. In specification (4) we use the self-assessed likelihood of becoming a partner as dependent variable; the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a strictly non-zero self-assessed likelihood of becoming an equity or non-equity partner at the current organization. The dependent variable in specification (5) is Any bonus pay which is a dummy variable equal to one if a lawyer receives any bonus pay. Small firm is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the organization is below the median in terms of employees. Vacancies per lawyer is the number of job openings for lawyers in a state standardized by the number of lawyers in that state. Top tier law school (college) is a dummy equal to one if the lawyer graduated from a top tier law school (college). Any time outside office is a dummy variable equal to one if the lawyer spends any time attending networking functions or recreational networks that involve socializing with peers at other firms. The set of demographic controls are defined in table 1 and consists of Age, Age squared, Tenure, Tenure squared, Female, White, Married, Mother is a lawyer, Father is a lawyer, and Number of lawyers in organization. Regressions are estimated using OLS and include different set of fixed effects as denoted at the bottom of the table. Errors are clustered at the state level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 6 Outcomes
The dependent variable in specifications (1) and (2) is Short horizon, a dummy variable equal to one if the desired length of stay with the current employer is less or equal than 2 years. The dependent variable in specification (3) is the horizon with the current employer, ranging from 1 -"already looking for a new job" to 5 -"more than 5 years". The dependent variables in specification (4) and (5) is Total hours, the total number of hours the lawyer worked in a given week. The dependent variables in specification (6) and (7) is Fraction hours outside, the fraction of hours spent in networking activities as a fraction of the total hours worked in a given week. The dependent variables in specification (8) and (9) is New client, a dummy variable equal to one if the individual has brought in a new client in the last 12 months. The dependent variables in specification (10) and (11) is Value of new clients, the revenues generated by the clients that were brought in by the individual. Any long-term incentive pay or partner is a dummy variable equal to one if a lawyer receives any equity or option pay or if she is already a partner. Log(Total pay) is the logarithm of total pay. Vacancies per lawyer is the number of job openings for lawyers in a state standardized by the number of lawyers in that state. Top tier law school (college) is a dummy equal to one if the lawyer graduated from a top tier law school (college). The set of demographic controls are defined in table 1 and consists of Age, Age squared, Tenure, Tenure squared, Female, White, Married, Mother is a lawyer, Father is a lawyer, and Number of lawyers in organization. Regressions are estimated using OLS and include different set of fixed effects as denoted at the bottom of the table. Errors are clustered at the state level and corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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